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Abstract
In recent years, botnets have emerged as a serious threat on the Internet. Botnets are
commonly used for exploits such as distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks, identity
theft, spam, and click fraud. The immense size of botnets, some consisting of hundreds of
thousands of compromised computers, increases the speed and severity of attacks.
Unlike passive behavior anomaly detection techniques, active botnet detection aims to
collect evidence actively, in order to reduce detection time and increase accuracy. In this
project, we develop and analyze a botnet that we call ActiBot, which can evade some
types of active detection mechanisms. Future research will focus on using ActiBot to
strengthen existing detection techniques.
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1. Introduction
1.1 What is a Bot?
The word bot is short for ―robot.‖ In software, a bot is an automated program that can
execute certain commands. Generally, bots are remotely controlled by a master via one or
more controller hosts. The controller is often an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) server. IRC is
normally used to relay messages among client terminals [13]. A first-generation bot is a
program that interacts with a chat service to automate tasks for a human, such as creating
chat logs. These chat bots were designed to help operate chat rooms, or to entertain chat
users [1].
Today, the main use of bots is sending chat spam. Modern chat bots deliver spam URLs
via either links in chat messages or user profile links. A single bot operator, controlling a
few hundred bots, can distribute spam links to thousands of users, making chat bots very
profitable to the bot operator, who is paid per generated click. Other potential abuses of
bots include spreading malware, phishing, booting and similar malicious activities [1].
Compromised computers are controlled by malware, which is malicious software
designed to break security. Compromised hosts are usually referred to as ―zombies.‖

1.2 Classification of Bots
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Bots can be classified as benign, gray-area, or malicious. Here, we briefly discuss each of
these categories.
1.2.1Benign bots

Benign bots include search bots, shopping bots, and telephony bots. These bots are used
to automate basic and innocent tasks on Internet relay chat (IRC). For example, a
searchbot is user’s own personal search robot that continuously searches the Internet
trying to find all the best websites it can on user’s behalf. User can even ask a searchbot a
question and it will talk to other searchbots to find an answer [17]. Such a benign bot
provide us a more creative and convenient life. Some other countless examples can be
found at bot knowledge website [14].
1.2.2 Gray-area bots

This category refers to bots that are neither clearly benign nor clearly malicious. Some
examples of gray-area bots include Blogbots, xdcc, fserve bots and Trainer bots
(MMORPGs) [5]. Blogbots is open-sourced software for Microsoft Outlook and Internet
Explorer that allows users to subscribe to RSS or ATOM feeds. Right now, just about
every web-site, blog, wiki or newsletter is supporting this format [15]. Using such bots is
a new way to put the internet to work for users.
1.2.3 Malicious bots

Malicious bots are designed to coordinate and conduct attacks on networked computers.
Examples of such attacks include denial-of-service [2], identity theft and sending mass
spam. Spambot is one of the popular malicious bots, which is designed to collect, or
12

harvest, e-mail addresses from the Internet. A spambot starts out on a web page. It scans
the page for two things: hyperlinks and email addresses. It stores the email addresses to
use as targets for spam, and follows each hyperlink to a new page, starting the process all
over [18]. Another example is the zombie computer (often shortened as a zombie), it is a
computer connected to the Internet that has been compromised by a cracker, computer
virus or trojan horse can be used to perform malicous task or launch DoS attack [16].
Most owners of zombie computers are unaware that their system is being used in this way.
There are a lot more examples we can find out in the world. All of these bots have some
key characteristics including process forking with network and file access, and
propagation potential [16].

1.3 What is Botnet?
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Figure 1: How a botnet is used to send email spam

The word botnet is a combination of the words robot and network. A botnet is a
collection of zombie computers that are controlled by a ―botmaster‖ [3]. Such a collection
of compromised computers is usually built up over a long period of time. A botnet can be
employed to unleash a DDoS (distributed denial of service) attack or used to send very
large quantities of spam. DDoS attack relies primarily on brute force attack, flooding the
target with an oversaturating flux of packets, using up the resources of targeted system or
depleting its connection bandwidth. In February 2007, more than 10,000 online game
servers in games such as Halo, Return to Castle Wolfenstein, Counter-Strike and many
others were attacked by the hacker group RUS. The DDoS attack was made from more
than a thousand computer units located in the republics of the former Soviet Union,
mostly from Russia, Uzbekistan and Belarus. Minor attacks are still continuing to be
made today [2].
Botnets’ size could vary from tens to hundreds of thousands of systems, and one single
botnet may cross plenty of homes, corporate and educational networks [19]. Botnets are
usually used as zombies for executing a variety of malicious tasks [4]. The size of botnets
and their potential power to attack afforded by the combination their processing potency
and bandwidth have resulted to a general understanding that botnets are major threat to
the network security, due to the low cost of conducting a botnet attack. Kaspersky
Laboratories has researched price of botnet attacks in chat rooms and clandestine
websites and found the following [20]:
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Hiring a botnet for DDoS attacks costs from $50 to thousands of dollars for a
continuous 24-hour attack.



Stolen bank account details vary from $1 to $1,500 depending on the level of
detail and account balance.



Personal data capable of allowing the criminals to open accounts in stolen names
costs $5 to $8 for US citizens.



A list of one million emails addresses costs between $20 and $100; spammers
charge $150 to $200 extra for doing the mailshot.



Targeted spam mailshots can cost from $70 for a few thousand names to $1,000
of tens of millions of names.



User accounts for paid online services and games stores such as Steam go for $7
to $15 per account.



Phishers pay $1,000 to $2,000 a month for access to fast flux botnets, which is a
DNS technique used by botnets to hide phishing and malware delivery sites
behind an ever-changing network of compromised hosts acting as proxies.



Spam to optimize a search engine ranking is about $300 per month.

From this research data, we can see that a low-cost botnet attack could result in
significant harm and losses.
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1.4 Classification of Botnets
Many papers try to provide taxonomy of botnets [22], using properties such as the
propagation mechanism, the topology of Command and Control (C&C) infrastructure
used the exploitation strategy, or the set of commands available to the perpetrator. It is
known that botnets have thousands of different implementations, which can be classified
into two major categories based on their topologies. The most common type is a C&C
botnet. C&C botnets have a centralized architecture, which has enabled researchers to
develop some feasible countermeasures to detect and destroy such botnets [23, 24].
Hence, newer and more sophisticated botnets often use Peer to Peer (P2P) technologies.
1.4.1 Command and Control botnet

A botmaster uses command and control (C&C) channel to command his/her bot army to
carry out a variety of tasks. Though developers of botnet own the capability to create new
C&C protocols, communications of the most contemporary C&C botnet are built on top
of some popular protocols like IRC (Internet Relay Chat) and HTTP.
As HTTP botnets use HTML to communicate, naturally they try to blend into normal
HTTP traffic, but HTTP botnets are also hosted on legitimate (hacked) websites and they
use specially registered domain names for their purpose. One major advantage of HTTP
based botnets over traditional C&C botnet is the fact that more information can be easily
presented to the botmaster [6]. But as the most popular botnets, IRC-based botnet use
IRC protocol for text-based instant messaging over the Internet. It is based on
client/Server (C/S)model but suited for distributed environment as well [25].
16

The attacker’s operations on IRC-based botnet have four stages.
1. The creation stage is where the attacker may add malicious code or just modify an
existing one out of numerous highly configurable bots over the Internet [26].
2. The configuration stage occurs when the IRC server and channel information is
collected. As long as the bot is installed on the victim, it will automatically
connect to the selected host [26]. Then, the attacker may restrict the access and
secure the channel to the bots for business or some other purpose
3. The third stage is the infection stage, where bots are propagated by various direct
and indirect means [26]. As the name implies, direct techniques exploit
vulnerabilities of the services or operating systems and are usually associated with
the use of viruses.
4. The final stage is the control stage, where the attacker can send the instructions to
a group of bots via IRC channel to perform some malicious tasks.
1.4.2 P2P botnets

P2P botnets is a peer-to-peer network of bots that perform malicious task as both a client
and a server. Newer botnets are almost entirely P2P, with command-and-control
embedded into the botnet itself. By being dynamically updateable and variable they can
evade having any single point of failure. Commanders can be identified solely through
secure keys and all data except the binary itself can be encrypted. For example, a spyware
program may encrypt all suspected passwords with a public key hard coded or distributed
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into the bot software. Only with the private key, which only the botmaster has, can the
data that the bot has captured be read [7].
1.4.4 What’s our target

Although recently HTTP-based botnets and P2P botnets have drawn considerable
attention, we must keep in mind that one consistent and major threat to network security
is still from the IRC-based botnets. It’s still one of common form of botnet all over the
world, as shown in Figure 2 [21]. The simplicity and flexibility fulfilled by the IRC’s
text-based protocol could attribute to the consistence communication channels of IRCbased botnet.
Moreover, nowadays IRC botnets have been developed to a new state in which the
content of C&C IRC messages is obfuscated by exploiting a foreign language, a custom
sign, or some simple obfuscation techniques like hashing, XOR, or simple substitution.
There is no difficulty for these botnets to evade most of the existing and popular botnet
detection method like behavior-based approaches and signature-based detection by using
obfuscated IRC messages (e.g., ―hi‖ instead of ―print‖).
This is a truth that we’ve found that obscure C&C communications have been utilized in
a number of existing IRC-based botnets. More and more attackers/botmasters are using
IRC bots to channel Trojans containing viruses and worms onto unsuspecting Internet
users' computers. IRC is one of the earliest versions of Internet ―chatting,‖ and is still
widely used by groups of people with common interests. So bots were originally used by
IRC members to manage access lists, run quizzes, or serve files, which make an IRC bot
18

more difficult to be recognized on internet by pretending an ―IRC‖ human user.
Recognizing an IRC bot infected machine is not always easy by passively collecting
evidence. It has already become a hot topic for most of the information security scientist.

Figure 2: Distribution of C&C botnets

2. Botnet Detection
Botnet detection is a detection technology aiming to detect any bot-infected host in
network by collecting evidence. Those detection methods could be classified into two
classifications: passive detection and active detection. Active botnet detection method is
an innovated and unique technology, which was raised by a study group in SRI
International, Texas A&M University, and Georgia Institute of Technology [8].
Nevertheless most of the existing botnet detection is passive detection, which means
19

collecting evidence passively after any damage happens. Like the intrusion detection,
passive botnet detection has two subcategories: Behavior-based botnet detection and
signature-based botnet detection.

2.1 Behavior-based botnet detection
By monitoring the behavioral anomalies, behavior-based botnet detection approaches are
proposed and utilized to detect botnets. Many such systems have been developed in the
past few years [27] [28] [29]. Behavior-based botnet detection techniques assume that an
intrusion could be detected by observing a deviation from normal or expected behavior of
the system or the users [30]. The model which defines what normal and valid behavior is
extracted from reference information collected by various means. The botnet detection
system later compares this model with the current activity. When a deviation is observed,
an alarm is generated. In other words, anything that does not correspond to a previously
learned behavior is considered infection. Therefore, the botnet detection system might be
complete (i.e. all infections should be caught), but its accuracy is a difficult issue, which
means you will get considerable false alarms [8]. From the below figure, you can easily
find the false alarm rate of one behavior-based detection system. The average of false
positive over negative is about 1.4%, which would be a real concern to the users.
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Figure 3: An example of the false alarm rate of a behavior-based detection system

Advantages of behavior-based approaches are that they can detect attempts to exploit new
and unforeseen infection. They can even contribute to the (partially) automatic discovery
of these new attacks [30]. They are less dependent on operating system-specific
mechanisms.
The high false alarm rate is generally cited as the main drawback of behavior-based
techniques because the entire scope of the behavior of an information system may not be
covered during the learning phase. Also, behavior can change over time, introducing the
need for periodic online retraining of the behavior profile, result to either in unavailability
of the botnet detection system or in additional false alarms [31].
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2.2 Signature-based botnet detection
Majority of the commercial products are based on signatures which examine the traffic
looking for well known patterns of attack [32]. Signature-based detection system
monitors packets sending back and forth in the network and compares with predefined
and preconfigured attack patterns which are known as signatures. But the problem is that
there will be lag time between signature being applied for detecting a new threat and the
new threat discovered. During this lag time the detection system will be not able to
identify the threat [33].
Key advantage of using signature based detection method is that signatures are easy to
develop and understand if you know what network behavior you're trying to identify (that
is, if you already have a copy of the exploit). However, with tools like Metasploit and
new obfuscation techniques it provides this task is becoming difficult but still achievable
to some extent [33].
The events generated by a signature-based botnet detection system can very precisely
inform you about what caused the alert. Some of the modern logging systems also allow
you to attach packet-captures with every event triggered making it easy to research on the
issue
However, all these techniques above have its own limitations. Group analysis is used by
some techniques to detect botnet. Nevertheless, those techniques request the occurrence
of certain amount of bots in the network being monitored. What’s more, they could not
really work while in the network there is just one infected host. Moreover, some other
detection techniques may request more time to gather enough evidence to improve it
22

self’s confidence to identify a botnet [8]. For example, an offline correlation engine that
executes daily group analysis on C-plane data is running in BotMiner [27]. Although
BotSniffer is one more agile technique, which in its spatio-temporal correlation still
request to observe some rounds of communication to collect enough evidence [29]. To
claim an infection, BotHunter apply a primary signature-based approach to detect botinfected host, which also requires monitoring the communication or performance from
several stages of the bot lifecycle as well in order to help the detection system with
enough confidence. In contrast, real-world IRC-based botnet C&C communications can
be quiet, i.e., some have infrequent C&C interactions because the botmaster is not always
online to command the bot army. If the frequency of C&C interaction is low enough,
botnets could possibly evade the detection of these systems [8]. Indeed, stealthy botnets
with small sizes, obfuscated C&C dialogs, and infrequent C&C interactions pose an
ongoing challenge to the malware research community.
To address this challenge, a new botnet detection system explores a new botnet detection
technique which is able to collect evidence actively. The following questions are
answered by active botnet detection: Can we still claim a bot-infection with a high
confidence by only observing one round of obscure chat-like botnet C&C communication?
How about zero round? Active botnet detect is the solution [8] which is able to achieve
the goal to detect a lot of existing IRC botnets and complement some current detection
approaches in the world.
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3. Active botnet detection - BotProbe
Some authors believe that it is almost impossible to indentify obscure chat-like botnet
command and control (C&C) communications with traditional signature-based
techniques, because it looks like similar to human-to-human communication, which
means it is indistinguishable for computer system[8]. As mentioned above, the passive
behavior-based anomaly detection techniques which exist nowadays either needs to keep
monitoring several bot-infected hosts that belong to one botnet or require certain time
period in collecting evidence, which makes their effect limited. In [8], the potential of
active botnet probing techniques is exploited by the author as a middlebox in the network,
which aims to complement and augment the existing passive botnet C&C detection
approaches, it is able to easily identify infrequent C&C communication and obfuscated
content in C&C message in small botnets. What’s more, an algorithmic framework is
introduced in [8]. To distinguish botnet C&C communications from human-human
conversations, it implements a prototype system named BotProbe by using hypothesis
testing with considerable accuracy. They also conducted server experiment on multiple
real-world IRC bots, the result of which in this paper prove that obscure and obfuscated
botnet communications can be successfully identified by their proposed active botnet
detection techniques. They also conduct a study with real-world user on hundreds of
participants, which indicates that when it comes to human-to-human communication the
active botnet detection techniques have a very low false positive rate. A discussion on
BotProbe’s limitations is presented as well. New directions and ideas are expected to be
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inspired in the feasibility study by using active botnet detection techniques in the
malware research and botnet research communities.

3.1 Key observation
Active botnet detection posits that we should apply active execution of selecting
suspicious interaction rather than passively monitoring two-way network traffic to better
identify the communication of botnet. This strategy of detection named active botnet
probing is based on the following two observations [8].
1. A clear command-response pattern could be found in a typical botnet C&C
interaction. Thus to a certain dialog replays, a stateless bot is supposed to act
deterministically, while it will be a nondeterministic interaction with a humancontrolled end point.
2. Second, unlike humans, bots has limited tolerance for typographical errors
during communication, because of their being preprogrammed to respond to
the set of commands they receive.

3.2 Active probing techniques
Based on both key observations above, active botnet detection is used in BotProbe system,
using the following active probing techniques.
P0: Explicit-Challenge-Response
There is one example explicit validation mechanism where educated users knowingly
participate in the BotProbe scheme. A reverse Turing test would be prompted for users to
perform in the BotProbe system, when BotProbe first detect a new IRC session between
25

two IP addresses. The system might also redirect the internal human IRC users to visit a
secure web site where users are required to parse a CAPTCHA. In computing, this is a
typical challenge-response test widely used to distinguish a response is not made from a
computer [9]. A small puzzle could also be added by BotProbe for the user to solve as an
alternative way. With the help of this approach, BotProbe maybe able to identify a botnet
channel before capturing actual C&C interaction, in another word, BotProbe doesn’t
require observing any round of communication. But this is a simple and effective
technique which requires user tolerance, awareness, and compliance [8].
P1: Session-Replay-Probing
The addresses of the servers are spoofed by the BotProbe monitor. And other TCP
packets would be appended by BotProbe replaying the same control command to the
remote end for a number of times. If a bot is the client, it will probably perform responses
that are deterministic (in regarding to both timing and content) [8].
P2: Session-Byte-Probing
With this probing approach, a few bytes of the control command would be randomly
permutes by the BotProbe monitor. Assume a bot is the client, and then it is expected to
be highly sensitive to the changed commands by BotProbe in order to react quite
differently and the whole packet may even be dropped. Nevertheless, a higher tolerance
is expected for a human user chatting in an IRC channel for the typo errors of an IRC
message. By interleaving strategies P1 and P2, this test might be repeated by BotProbe
for several times as necessary until BotProbe has sufficient confidence and evidence to
make a conclusion. The authors also discussed this algorithm (Interleaved-Binary26

Response-Hypothesis) used in BotProbe in more detail in their paper [8]. Generally, this
algorithm assume that the probability of a human user responses to tampered packets
(interleaved P1 and P2 probing for example) with repeatable content is pretty low, which
is near to ¼ [8]. But this probability of a bot with the response is observed as 1. The main
benefit of this algorithm is that they could find out a general method to detect the thirdparty access response which doesn’t need to depend on the signatures of content.
We also note that in the same TCP session if subsequent C&C interactions occur, by
inserting new TCP packets, the existing connections may be broken by approached P1
and P2. To prevent this, the numbers of TCP packet (sequence and acknowledge) would
be altered by their in-line botnet probing system along with checksums to specify a new
TCP packets that are produced by the P1 and P2 probes. Plus, at the application level,
certain amount of interference will also be introduced into current sessions by these two
probing approached. Nevertheless, the authors find out that there is another probing
technique (P3) that will not impact current sessions for their targeted IRC protocols [8].
P3: Client-Replay-Probing
Users are allowed by IRC, like the other chat protocols, to send messages to each other
directly. In this case, BotProbe create a new user which then logins to the channel being
monitored and sends the captured command(s) to the suspicious client(s), acting as the
botmaster. By using this approach, BotProbe will not break current connections, but
achieve the same goal like P1 and P2 [8].
P4: Man-In-The-Middle-Probing
27

None observed command packet is intercepted by any of the above techniques directly.
But, in some situations, such as the simple replay-probing may not have effect in highly
stateful C&Cs, BotProbe intercepts the new command, and performs message injection
like a man-in-the-middle chat [8].
P5: Multi-client-Probing
However, there is an assumption for all the above techniques, which is to probe a session
from one single client. In the network, when multiple likely infected clients being
monitored are interacting with the same C&C server, BotProbe reduces the number of
probing rounds needed to validate its hypothesis and distributes these probing approaches
among multiple clients [8].

3.3 Limitations and possible evasions
According to above, BotProbe only works on a number of assumptions. It is limited to a
specific category of botnets which is using chatting-like C&C. Therefore, we can easily
find out some limitations in BotProbe, based on which we will discuss some possible
evasions as show below.
3.3.1 Strong encryption evasion

Those botnet C&C channels which adopt strong encryption obfuscation schemes, making
them resilient to replay attacks, could not be identified by active probing techniques.
Although, the existing passive botnet detection strategies are not able to detect such
channels and most of the existing IRC botnets just use some or even don’t use such weak
encryption schemes. So in order to avoid active botnet detection, all botnets should use
28

strongly encrypted communication. Arguably, using such strong encrypted
communication in botnet sometimes may possibly expose the bots as suspicious and
therefore not expected by botmasters in some cases. So in our case, we can use a
symmetric key cipher to encrypt our communication and adopt timestamp to evade the
replay probing technique.
3.3.2 Timer-based evasion

Some knowledgeable attackers would design bots to use programmed timers which could
randomly and delay the response time (the time between the sending out a command and
observing a response) greatly, or set a range of the number of one command which could
be received from the botmaster in a certain time period [8].
BotProbe replay one suspicious command in each detecting round using the P1 approach,
then it records whether or not the response is expected, which is named Single-BinaryResponse-Hypothesis algorithm. A bot is able to evade BotProbe’s Single-BinaryResponse-Hypothesis algorithm potentially, with the help of such a timer described above.
Nevertheless, this approach will do harm to the efficiency of the botnet since the
botmaster is not able to send C&C to the botnet in a timely manner or perform some
identical task(s) repeatedly in a certain time window. A possible implementation is to use
a timer to delay the bots’ response time to the command from botmaster.
3.3.3 Stateful C&C protocols

The P1 and P2 probing techniques both have an assumption that the C&C protocol is
stateless, i.e., BotProbe replays the captured command for certain times, and bots are
29

expected to always respond similarly to the replayed command. So in this case, a
processor to process stateful command could be created by the botmaster in order to
detect identical commands, e.g., by using sequence number or a timestamp within every
command sent to make the simple replay probing technique ineffective. In our case, we
would rather use timestamp to create an application-leveled stateful C&C protocol to
detect duplicate commands.

4. Possible evasion
Since active botnet detection technology is still not perfect with such limitations
discussed above. We’re trying to attack or evade the detection of BotProbe system by
implementing an advanced obscure command and control channels botnet. In this botnet,
we propose the following four main features:
1. Using strong cipher to encrypt the communication.
2. Adopt a timer to slow down the bot’s response.
3. Apply mutli-channel communication between botmaster and bot.
4. Using stateful communication

4.1 Encrypted communication
In our implementation, we adopt blowfish cipher, a strong symmetric block cipher, to
encrypt the communication between botmaster and bot, since it is easy to be implemented
and not suspicious, since symmetric block cipher is widely used in IRC communication.
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4.1.1 Blowfish cipher

Figure 4: Blowfish cipher

Blowfish comes within a large scale encryption products and cipher suites. Its good
encryption rate in software is quite impressive and there is not any effective cryptanalysis
found to date [34].
Blowfish’s block size is 64-bit long. Length of the variable key is from 1 bit up to 448
bits [10]. A 16-round Feistel cipher is used and large key-dependent S-boxes are adopted
as well. It is almost the same as CAST-128 in structure that uses fixed S-boxes.
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Figure 5: Blowfish cipher encryption

This diagram above shows the process of Blowfish cipher. Each line stands for 32 bits.
There are two subkey arrays kept by this algorithm: the P-array containing 18 entries and
S-boxes which have four 256-entries. The S-boxes take an eight-bits-long input and
generate a 32-bits-long output for the P-array. Every round there is one entry of the Parray would be used, and then after the final round, one of the two remaining unused Pentries is xored with each half of the data block [10].
The diagram shows Blowfish's F-function, this function divides the 32-bit input into four
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quarters in the length of eight-bit each, which then are introduced to the S-boxes as input.
At the end, the outputs of S-boxes are added modulo 232, and then a final 32-bit output is
produced by xoring the result.
Similar to the encryption process, P1, P2... P18 are applied to the decryption process in
the reverse order. It is quite unobvious since xor is associative and commutative. It is one
of the common mistakes to adopt reverse order of encryption as decryption algorithm (for
example: the first cipher text block is produced by xoring P17 and P18, then the P-entries
are used in reverse order).
By initializing the S-array and P-boxes with values produced from the hexadecimal digits
of pi without any apparent pattern, Blowfish's key schedule begins. Then the secret key
starts to cycle the key byte to byte as needed, xored with every input from P-array one by
one. A 64-bits-long block with all zero is then encrypted by the algorithm as it function,
whose output as cipher text take place of P1 and P2. The identical cipher text is then used
to encrypt the new subkeys, and then P3 and P4 are both replaced by the new cipher text.
This procedure repeats to replace the entire P-array and all input of the S-box. After all,
the Blowfish encryption algorithm needs to be executed 521 times to produce all these
subkeys, which means about 4KB of data is computed [10].
As a result of the P-array is 576-bits-long, all these 576 bits are xored through the key
bytes during the initialization, most of the existing implementations support key sizes up
to 576 bits. But this is absolutely possible. The limit of 448 bits is used to make sure that
each bit in each subkey relies on each bit in the key [10], since the last four values of the
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P-array cannot impact any bit of the cipher text. This point is considered as a requirement
in implementations with variable rounds, moreover this also improves the security against
the exhaustive search attack, and however it weakens the security that this algorithm
promises. As a result of the slow initialization of the cipher with every tiny difference of
the key, Blowfish was borned with a natural defense against the brute-force attacks,
which really cannot justify any key whose size is over 448 bits long [10].
In 1996, Serge Vaudenay found a known-plaintext attack needing 28r + 1 known plaintexts
to break, where r is the number of rounds [10]. Nevertheless, there is no effective
cryptanalysis found up to now against the full-round version of Blowfish [34].
We adopt Blowfish cipher to encrypt every command sent to the bot, we can efficiently
prevent being intercepted and the replay probing by using a powerful but not so doubtful
encryption as SSL/SSH.

4.2 A timer to slow down response
A timer implemented to delay the response time, the time between sending out the
command and observing the response, is one of the effective evasion techniques. By
using such a timer to delay the response time, a bot can evade one of BotProbe’s
assumptions which assume the bot would perform the same action after receiving a
replayed command in a certain time window. So we can implement a random timer to
generate some random time interval after which the bot will response to a
preprogrammed command. This approach will easily confuse the BotProbe. If the
response occurs out of BotProbe’s time window for one round of active probing, this
respond evade the detection successfully. In another case, if a respond is caught by
34

BotProbe, BotProbe will replay the command and expect the same response after the
same time interval, which is unlikely to happen due to the randomly generated number
from our timer. A random time interval will make it hard for the BotProbe to confirm an
activity is the same response to a replayed command sent by the system itself. This
unpredictable response would undermine BotProbe’s confidence to confirm a bot
infection.
In a word, the random-timer make our advanced bot act more like a human, whose
activities are unique and natural.

4.3 Multiple channel communication
The basic means of communicating to a group of users in an established IRC session is
through a channel. Channels are the communication medium in an IRC session. Channels
on a network can be displayed using the IRC command LIST that lists all currently
available channels on that particular network. Users can join to a channel using the JOIN
command, in most clients available as /join #channel name. Messages sent to the joined
channels are then relayed to all other users.
BotProbe’s P1 and P2 probing techniques assume all the communication happens in one
single channel, i.e., BotProbe replays the observed command several times to the bot in
one channel, and check to see if the bot always responds similarly to the same command.
So if the bot receive a command but response in another new channel, BotProbe could
not detect anything abnormal, what’s more, if the new channel is randomly picked by the
Botmaster and Bot, it will make it harder for BotProbe’s P1 and P2 probing techniques to
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detect any response. BotProbe cannot even detect any identical response. So when a bot
receive a command from the botmaster, our bot would randomly create and join a new
channel, based on botmaster’s command. Our bot would leave the current channel after
notifying the botmaster with the new channel, where the bot would response to the
command received in current channel. With the randomly-generated channel, it’s another
possible evasion to make the communication undetectable.

4.4 Stateful communication
Moreover, BotProbe’s P1 and P2 probing techniques both assume a stateless C&C
protocol, i.e., it will keep sending one observed command several times to the clients, and
the bots are expected always responds similarly to this replayed command. So in our
implementation, we could create a stateful communication that provide our bots with the
capability to detect duplicate or replayed commands by including a timestamp or
sequence number in every command sent. This approach could easily make simple replay
probing technique ineffective. For instance, when our bot receive a command, it will first
compare the timestamp received in the command with the current timestamp. Then it will
determine whether this command is a replayed command or not, based on the difference
of these two timestamp. If this command is considered as a replayed command, the bot
will then respond to it with some random normal content, which makes our bot behave
non-deterministically as a normal human user.
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5 ActiBot
We implement a botnet called ActiBot, which is based on the Eggdrop botnet [11].
Eggdrop is one of the most popular and best supported, open source IRC bot, designed
for flexibility and ease of use, and is freely distributable under the GNU General Public
License (GPL). All features we designed are implemented over Eggdrop.
An IRC bot is a program that sits in an IRC channel around the clock, keeping it open 24
hours a day. It looks just like a normal user on the channel, but is usually idle until it's
called upon to perform a particular function.
And all our implemented commands are DCC commands. Direct Client-to-Client (DCC)
is an IRC-related sub-protocol enabling peers to interconnect using an IRC server for
handshaking in order to exchange files or perform non-relayed chats. Once established, a
typical DCC session runs independently from the IRC server. The DCC chat service
enables users to chat with each other over a DCC connection. The traffic will go directly
between the users, and not over the IRC network. When compared to sending messages
normally, this reduces IRC network load, allows sending of larger amounts of text at once,
due to the lack of flood control, and makes the communication more secure by not
exposing the message to the IRC servers.
To realize those four features listed in above section, ActiBot adopts the following
concrete implementations in two DCC commands (.enc and .mul):
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1. Implement blowfish cipher to encrypt and decrypt the .enc command sent
from the botmaster to a bot in ActiBot.
2. Implement a stateful communication, using timestamp as the time/state
indicator in the .enc command. So the bot could decide how to response to a
specific command after comparing the receive time and current time.
3. By using a timer, to slow down the response to .mul command.
4. Create a multiple channel communication, allowing the bot response to a
command sent from botmaster in a randomly created new channel after
negotiation.
5. Adopt user authentication to identify the botmaster, only receive and response
to the command sent out by the authenticated user, who is recognized as the
botmaster.

5.1 Blowfish cipher
Blowfish cipher is a build-in feature in Eggdrop Botnet, which is well implemented with
friendly API. We use tcl script to adopt Blowfish cipher to encrypt a specific DCC
command named .enc. The symmetric key for encryption and decryption is predefined by
the user/botmaster, and is stored in a file along with the bot instance. After our bot
receive .enc this encrypted command, it will use the key to decrypt the command. If the
content of this command is validated, a preprogrammed response will be launched.
Otherwise the bot will response with some random content.
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5.2 Stateful communication
Timestamp is always a good indicator of state. A timestamp is a sequence of digits,
denoting the date and/or time at which a certain event occurred. A timestamp is the time
at which an event is recorded by a computer. Comparing to sequence number, timestamp
is more efficiency without the need to remember the sequence number in a
communication session.
The UNIX epoch (or UNIX time or POSIX time or UNIX timestamp) is the number of
seconds that have elapsed since January 1, 1970 (midnight UTC/GMT), not counting leap
seconds (in ISO 8601: 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z). So in ActiBot, we treat this number of
seconds as an integer, which is easy for the use of comparison and encryption. We
implement this feature in .enc command for a stateful communication, making the bot
only response deterministically at the first time when it receives a new .enc command.
After the first time receiving this command, the bot will turn into the second state which
means if the bot receive this command again, which will then be considered as a replayed
command, it will just response with some random text data as a normal human user.

5.3 Slow down response
The response time is sensitive information to whatever detection system. If a command is
detected, the detection system will then keep monitoring the future traffic for the related
response. If the client does not take any malicious or suspicious action in a certain time
interval, the detection system would easily be seduced to consider this is a normal
activity. In this way, as time goes by, the suspicion of detection system is getting close to
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clear. Then after the suspicion is purged, any malicious action will not be very easy to be
considered as a sign of bot infection. In ActiBot, we try to use a timer to randomly
determine the response time to a command, which is between 0 seconds to 100 seconds.
For instance, after the bot received a command, there is no rush to response to it
immediately. Our bot will then enable a timer with a random timer interval. And it will
only response after the random timer interval has elapsed.

5.4 Multiple channel communication
In ActiBot, we implemented a DCC command .mul, following the format: .mul <prefix of
the new channel name>, in order for the botmaster to create a new channel for further
communication with the bots. With this command, botmaster could specify the prefix of
the name of a new channel. And the bot would create a new channel based on the prefix
received in the command. After creating a new channel, the bot would notify the
botmaster with the new channel name, displaying it in the current channel’s chat console.
Then the bot will leave this channel, and join to the new channel it just created then
response there.
We propose this schema to create multi-channel communication.
1. Botmaster connect to a bot in a DCC channel.
2. Botmaster send out a DCC command .mul to the bot in such format: .mul
<#prefix of the new channel>.
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3. Bot receive the .mul command, and start to decide the rest of the new channel
name by using a random number generator.
4. After deciding the name of the new channel by combining the prefix from
botmaster and the random number generated, the bot notify the botmaster with
the full name in the chat console, and then leave the current channel.
5. After 5 seconds, a time interval for the bot and Botmaster to join the new
channel, the bot will provide the real or malicious response to the
command .mul receive in previous channel.

5.5 User authentication
We use a user file to store the user information. In ActiBot's userfile, the botmaster could
control who have the access to bots and what access level each of these users could have.
Ban lists and ignore lists are also contained in the userfile. One of the fundamental things
is userfile management which we could exploit to effectively use our advanced botnet.
When the new users first come to Eggdrop, they needs to use the hello command to
introduce themselves to the application, by which the new users are added to the user list.
Then the users must set a password by using the pass command once they have been
added. They need to follow the following command format /msg <botnick> pass
<password> to set their password. The .chpass command could be used to reset their
password in the future.
Once the userfile is setup, each DCC communication could be set up successfully after a
valid user is identified by Eggdrop Botnet. The scenario is once a connection to the bot is
established. The user will be prompted for the password, and then placed on the party line
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(the main chat area) automatically. This feature would prevent some unknown or
unauthenticated user to send any command to the bot on the test or detection purpose,
which is the P2 probing technique.

6. Test scenarios
Nothing could be better than to test our botnet with the BotProbe. But up to now
BotProbe is only a prototype system and an experimental article, not a real product in the
market. The authors of BotProbe are still investigating a more practical, robust, and less
controversial extensions of active techniques [8]. So we don’t have the luck to test our
botnet with real active botnet detection system. Hence, we just test our botnet in our
environment, and try to simulate the test scenarios as genuine as possible.

6.1 User authentication
In eggdrop, the first user is recognize as the administrator of a bot and has the privilege to
give other user access to the bot. And all these setting are store in a userfile protected by
MD5 cryptographic hash.
So in our case, we set up our own administrator’s account and use it to control our bot as
a botmaster. No other user could talk to our bot using DCC chat without the permission
from botmaster.
The purpose of this test is to evade the detection probe P3 (Client-Replay-Probing) and
P5 (Multi-Client-Probing). With both of these two probing, BotProbe will instantiate one
or several new user(s) that log(s) into the channel and sends some observed commands to
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the selected clients acting as the botmaster. Hence, with the user authentication, any
unauthenticated user created by BotProbe will not be allowed to access and detect the bot.
Only the botmaster and authenticated user could send command to the bots and control
the whole botnet. P3 and P5 probing technique would fail.
6.1.1 Scenario #1

a) Try to access it with an unauthenticated account.

Figure 6: Unauthenticated user login fail

b) Bot reply with error, denying the access from a strange user.
6.1.2 Scenario #2

a) Try to access the bot with an authenticated administrator account.
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Figure 7: Authenticated user login

b) Access accepted, login successfully as a botmaster.

Figure 8: Login succeed
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6.2 Blowfish cipher
Encrypting the communication with blowfish cipher can make ActiBot resilient to P4
(Man-In-The-Middle-Probing). Botmaster could create a symmetric key stored in the user
file while setting up the whole botnet, so that this key is shared between the botmaster
and bots. Botmaster then could use this shared key to encrypt the command sending to a
bot. And bot can also decrypt and read the command with this shared key. In this way,
ActiBot makes Botprobe hard to read and change any content of the command sending
from Botmaster to Bot.
To test the implementation of Blowfish cipher, we use wireshark to capture our packet
and try to read its content.
1) Enter a implemented DCC command:

.enc !mal

2) The bot receive the command which is encrypted by blowfish cipher.

Figure 9: Bot receive an encrypted command

In the above figure, we can clear see the cipher text of the encrypted command.
3) In the wireshark, we can intercept the package and see the workload.
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Figure 10: Encrypted command

4) The bot receive it and decrypt the command correctly.

Figure 11: Bot decrypt the encrypted command

6.3 Stateful communication
In order to evade the P1 (Session-Replay-Probing), we use timestamp as the state
indicator to establish a stateful communication. We set the threshold to 2 seconds,
allowing the latency of network delay.
In order to simulate the P1 replay probing, we set up our botnet to send out an .enc DCC
command 3 second after the botmaster initiate sending it out. This encrypted command
also contains a timestamp denoting the date and time when the botmaster initiate this
action. After comparing the current timestamp from system with the timestamp within the
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command, which shows this command is generated at 3 or more seconds before, the bot
would consider this package as a replay package and response with some random content
in order to evade this detection. The following is the test scenario.
1) Send the command .enc !mal 3 seconds after the botmaster initiate it.
2) The bot received such a package and compare the timestamp and find out it
exceeds the threshold (2 seconds). So the bot consider this is a replay command.
And it will not try to decrypt this command, then just response to the command
with some random content.

Figure 12: Being detected by P1

6.4 High tolerance
By using P2 (Session-Byte-Probing) detection techniques, the BotProbe monitor will
permute certain bytes in the observed application command randomly, which is
challenging the tolerance to typographical error.
So in order to evade P2 detection, we use the wildcard to increase our bot’s tolerance to
typographical error. In this way, while BotProbe permutes some bytes of our command,
the bots in ActiBot will still recognize this as an acceptable command and response to it.
To test this, we try to input three ―.enc‖ commands with different content, simulating the
P2 probing.
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1) Input the wrong format with ―.enc kenny‖, which is not follow the format
requirement starting with the exclamation mark ―!‖.

Figure 13: Being detected by P2

The bot didn’t recognize this command, and response with an alert for P2 probing
and some random content.
2) Input a correct command with ―.enc !mal‖.

Figure 14: Receive and response to a correct command

The bot consider it with a validated command and decrypt it successfully.
3) Input another command with a slight modification ―.enc !laml‖.

Figure 15: Tolerance to a typo in command

The bot still consider it as a validated command and decrypt it successfully.
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6.5 Multi-channel with timer-based communication
Both purpose of slowing down the response time and creating multi-channel
communication are make it more difficult for BotProbe to capture the response from the
bots in an ActiBot.
We integrate the multi-channel communication with timer-based communication in a
DCC command .mul. With this command, the botmaster requires the bot to response in a
new channel which is different from the current channel. Since the new channel is
decided by both the botmaster and the bot, it’s very difficult for a detection system to
associate this response with the correct command captured in a different channel.
Moreover, the response is also hard to be considered as a response to a DCC command,
due to the response time is longer than usual. Even the response is a malicious action,
which would draw the BotProbe’s attention; BotProbe has to take a lot of effort to find
out the exact corresponding command before performing any active detection. For
example to replay the command and wait for the expected same response from the bot, if
the replayed command is not the correct command, the bot in ActiBot will give out a
different response, which decrease the confidence of Botprobe to recognize it as a bot.
1) Our bot join in the channel #testBot. Botmaster is talking to the bot in this
channel.
2) Input the command: ―.mul #testMul‖. ―#testMul‖ is the prefix of the new channel
name decided by Botmaster.
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Figure 16: To join a new channel

The bot receive this command, and decide the rest of the name of new channel
with a random number, which in our case above is eighty-six. Then notify the
Botmaster before it leave.
3) The bot appear in the new channel ―#testMul82‖ and leave the old channel. After
5 seconds, in the new channel #testMul82, the bot response to the .mul received in
the old channel #testBot.

Figure 17: Bot appears in the new channel

7. Conclusion and future work
In this paper, we discussed and analyzed ActiBot, a botnet designed to evade active
detection. Specifically ActiBot was designed to evade the BotProbe active detection
system [8]. We considered the active botnet detection techniques employed by BotProbe
and discussed their limitations. The design of ActiBot was then discussed, and we
analyzed ActiBot from the perspective of active detection.
It is important to note that the purpose of this paper is not to encourage malicious
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activities. Instead, we hope to lay the foundation for further research into botnet detection.
We plan pursue such research in the future.
We believe that ActiBot would easily evade all of the active detection techniques
employed by BotProbe, with the exception of the explicit-challenge-response.
Overcoming this limitation would become a focus of further work of ActiBot. Of course,
we also plan to pursue improved detection mechanism that can be used to detect ActiBot
and similar botnets.
There is no doubt that active botnet detection is promising in the realm of botnet
detection research and market. But Active botnet detection definitely could be improved
and augmented by learning from some passive botnet detection approaches. For example,
BotProbe could utilize the database of abnormal behavior defined by some other botnet
detection system, so that BotProbe could improve its efficiency in detecting some known
botnets even without actively probing the bots’ communication.
Other than this, botnet detection research should utilize the advantages of both active
botnet detection and passive botnet detection in improving the defect of both detection
approaches.
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